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This article explores the international rzght of development, as expressed in the design oj
new trade-based international investment agreements (ILs). The article shows that,
hitherto, development has figured mostly in investment arbitration primarily through
'Jurisdictional gatekeeping" (what is designated to refer to issues involving access to
dispute resolution procedures under the ICSID Convention). As this article shows in
Parts I and II of this article, recent investment arbitrations in the past decade have
turned on the issue of how to reconcile and interp ret the meaning of 'investment" within
Article 25 of the ICSID Convention with the effect of the pro-development language in
the Preamble to the ICSID Convention. While the Salini test will remain a much-
debated approach in international investment interpretation, the main subjective
difficwlty in elevating development to a condition or criterion for investment treaty
coverage is that the international rght of development is itself a djnamic concept, with
equaly divergent methods for assessing "contributions to economic development" The
inherent fluidity of the concept of development, coupled with the absence of an)' language
within Article 25 of the ICSID on the international rght to development, further
supports the view that the Convention did not intend to impose development
contributions as a strict condition or mandatory criterion before gaining access to
ICSIDjurisdiction.
Rather than focus on the problematic uses of the international tight of development in
junsdictional gatekeeping, this article drams attention to the actual nature of the
international rzght to development and its implementation, which has less to do with
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Development in IIAs
justiciabilly (or adjudicated remedies) and more to do with the direct implementation
and supervision of States. The practicable development-oriented innovations in new
trade-based IIAs, such as tk COWESA Common Investment Agreement, the
ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement, and the ASEAN-China
Investment Agreement, appear to align more closely with the actual nature of the right
to development. These particular tjpes of IIAs, which ojen form part of a complete
trade cooperation package, operationalie the international rzght of development
through: (1) permissible deffirentiation or graduated implementation of host State
obligations, taking the host State's stage of economic development into account; (2)
transparency obligations and information exchanges between treaty partners; (3) joint
investment promotion activities by treaty partners; and (4) coordinated institutional
mechanisms that enable host State participation and access in monitoring treaty
intepretation and any investment-related rulemaking. These phenomena demonstrate a
marked paradigm shtft towards a more eff cfive deployment of the international right of
development in international investment rule-making.
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I. INTRODUCTION: DEVELOPMENT DEFINITIONS AND INVESTMENT
PROTECTION
In his dissenting opinion to the ad hoc committee's annulment decision in
Malaysia Plistorical Salvors v. Malaysia ("Malaysia Plistordcal Salvors"), Judge Mohamed
Shahabuddeen stressed that "[t]he outer limits of an ICSID investment comprise a
requirement for contribution to the economic development of the host
State... Contracting States did not agree that these burdens on them would apply to
benefit transactions which did not promote the economic development of the host
State. It is difficult to see how a purely commercial entity, intended only for the
enrichment of its owners and not connected with the economic development of
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the host State, is entitled to bring before ICSID a dispute concerning an
investment in the host State".1 This interpretation of the meaning of "investment"
under Article 25 of the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes
("ICSID") Convention 2 reflects the view that one of the aspects of the Salini test-
contribution to the host State's economic development - operates as a strict
condition or criterion, and not merely as an indicator or descriptive characteristic
of the existence of an investment.3
This particular use of the right of development focuses on its gatekeeping role,
or how contributions to a host State's development crucially determines the
existence of an investment entitled to treaty protection and access to ICSID
jurisdiction under Article 25 of the ICSID Convention. While reading in
"development" as a criterion or condition in this manner might appear intuitive to
properly upholding the "grand bargain" behind investment, 4 in practice, the
ambiguity of the term itself has demonstrated that arbitral tribunals' assessments of
"contributions to a host State's development" appear entirely subjective and
incapable of precise definition.5 As Part II shows, arbitral tribunals to this date
continue to differ widely on their respective interpretive approaches to this
question. The preponderance of arbitral decisions appears to favour treating
"development" as a characteristic or aspect of investment (and thus not
determinative of its existence); consistent with the clarification issued by Professor
Christoph Schreuer and his co-authors in the second edition of his authoritative
commentary to the ICSID Convention.6 However, none of these tribunals have
1 -Malaysia Historical Salvors Sdn Bhd v. Malaysia, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/10,
Decision on the Application for Annulment, 5 B T 21 (Apr. 16 2009) (Dissenting Opinion
ofJudge Mohamed Shahabuddeen).
2 Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals
of Other States, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 (1965), available at: http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/
ICSID/Rulesi~lain.jsp (last visited Nov. 1, 2011).
Salini Costruttori SpA and Italstrade SpA v. Kingdom of Morocco, ICSID Case No.
ARB/00/4, Decision on Jurisdiction, T 52: "...doctrine generally considers that
investment infers: contributions, a certain duration of performance of the contract and a
participation in the risks of the transaction (cf. commentary by E. Gaillard, cited above, p.
292). In reading the Convention's preamble, one may add the contribution to the economic
development of the host State of the investment as an additional condition." (emphasis
added).
4 See Jeswald W. Salacuse & Nicholas P. Sullivan, Do BITs Really Work?An Evaluation of
Bilateral Investment Treaties and their Grand Bargain, 46 H\R\Y. INT'1 L.J. 67 (2005); Kenneth J.
Vandevelde, A Brief Histor' of International Investment Agreements, 12 U.C. D \vis J. INT'L L. &
Poi,'v. 157 (2005-2006).
5 For recent surveys on this subject, see Julian Davis ]Mortenson, The Meaning of
Investment'.- ICSID's Travaux and the Domain of International Investment Law, 51 ILNRV. INT'L. L.
J. 257, 271-280 (2010).
6 CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, LORETTA I\ALINTOPPI, AUGUST REINISCH, & ANTHONY
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indicated a workable definition of the right of "development", much less a method
for empirically ascertaining the scope and extent of a contribution to the host
State's development. Rather, arbitral tribunals have been satisfied with recognizing
demonstrable linkages of an investment to the improvement of the host State's
economy, without the need to precisely identify how a given investment
specifically contributes to the host State's economic development. As a result, in
almost all cases where the development right has been considered (and whether as
a strict condition or a mere descriptive characteristic of investment) for purposes
of determining jurisdiction ratione materiae under Article 25 of the ICSID
Convention, arbitral tribunals have had little difficulty in confirming that an
investment has indeed contributed to the host State's development.
Part III shows that while the concept of development is not static in
international economic thought, it is nevertheless capable of normative description
and empirical assessment. Development as an international right has been
frequently recognized in international human rights instruments, particularly the
1986 United Nations General Assembly Declaration on the Right to
Development.7 While the justiciability of the right to development remains
contested by governments and scholars, the binding quality of the right does not
depend on its justiciability. Rather, the right to development, similar to other
international human rights, must be seen to operate under a paradigm of State
implementation and supervision, and less as a matter of direct adjudication (except
when binding legal instruments so provide). The established use of the
international right of development in the international legal canon, taken alongside
the plurality of economists' methods for empirically measuring or determining
economic development, confirms this understanding of development. However,
considering the inherent fluidity of the concept and right to development, coupled
with the absence of any language in Article 25 of the ICSID Convention that
specifically requires compliance with the right to development, it becomes even
more difficult to impose the Salini test and demand that "contributions to the host
State's economic development" be treated as a jurisdictional criterion.
Part IV recognizes the limitations to the current analytical focus on the role of
the international right of development for jurisdictional gatekeeping in
international investment arbitration, and posits that the new trade-based
International Investment Agreements ("IIA") use the concept of development in
ways more suited to its international implementation and States' supervision. This
article examines three examples of such treaties dealing extensively with
SINC\IR, Ti ICSID CONvNTION: A CONINIFTA1'RY TT 171-174 (2d ed. 2009).
7 Declaration on the Right to Development, G.A. Res. 41/128, U.N. Doc. A/RES
41/128 (Dec. 4 1986), available at http://www.un.org/documents/ga/
res/41/a41rl28.htm (last visited Nov. 1, 2011).
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investment within developing country regions: the 2007 Investment Agreement for
the COMESA (Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa) Common
Investment Area;8 the 2009 ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations)
Comprehensive Agreement;9 and the 2009 ASEAN-China Investment
Agreement.1 ' These recent treaties form part of a broader trade cooperation
package, and demonstrate the commitment of participating host States to affirm
the right to development through innovations such as: (1) permissible
differentiation or graduated implementation of host State obligations, taking the
host State's stage of economic development into account; (2) transparency
obligations and information exchanges between treaty partners; (3) joint
investment promotion activities by treaty partners; and (4) coordinated institutional
mechanisms that enable host State participation and access in monitoring treaty
interpretation and any investment-related rulemaking. These developments
demonstrate a marked paradigm shift towards a more effective deployment of the
international right of development in international investment rule-making.
In the conclusion, this article maintains that the international right of
development can be, and recently appears to be, a workable and vital aspect of
contemporary investment treaty design. While the majority of arbitral tribunals
rightly deny that "contribution to the host State's economic development" should
be viewed as a strict condition for treaty coverage and access to ICSID jurisdiction
(instead, treating the same as a descriptive characteristic or feature of investment),
this article submits that the international right of development has been more
effectively deployed in the emerging regimes created under the new trade-based
IIAs referred to above. These new trade-based IIAs provide for other feasible
gateways for the international right of development, which, (and perhaps more so
than its current jurisdictional gatekeeping role) concretely support the inherent
reciprocity of the host State's economic development and protection of investors
in international investment law.
1 Investment Agreement for the COMESA Common Investment Area, adopted at the
Twelfth Summit of COMESA Authority of Heads of State and Government, held in
Nairobi, Kenya (May 22-23, 2007), available at: http://vi.unctad.org/files/wksp/
iiawksp08/docs/wednesday/Exercise%20Materials/invagreecomesa.pdf (last visited Nov.
1, 2011).
9 ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement (Feb. 26 2009), adopted in Cha-am,
Thailand, available at: http://www.asean.org/22244.htm (last visited Nov. 1, 2011).
'(o Agreement on Investment of the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive
Economic Cooperation between the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the
People's Republic of China, 2009, available at: http://www.aseansec.org/22974.pdf (last
visited Nov. 1, 2011) (hereinafter ASEAN-China Investment Agreement).
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II. DEVELOPMENT IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT JURISPRUDENCE
Since the Salin arbitral tribunal articulated its "contribution to a host State's
economic development" criterion in 2001, around thirty arbitral tribunals to date
have extensively dealt with the Salin test." Not all of these involve ICSID
arbitrations - in three non-ICSID arbitrations, the Salini test had been considered
either tacitly or expressly when the arbitral tribunal was interpreting the bilateral
11 See -Malaysia Historical Salvors Sdn Bhd v. -Malaysia, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/10,
Award on Jurisdiction (-May 10, 2007); Bayindir Insaat Turizm Ticaret ve Sanayi A S v.
Pakistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/29, Decision on Jurisdiction (Nov. 14, 2005); Helnan
International Hotels A/S v. Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/19, Decision of the Tribunal
on Objection to Jurisdiction (Oct. 15, 2006); Saipem SpA v. Bangladesh, ICSID Case No.
ARB/05/07, Decision on jurisdiction and recommendation on provisional measures (Mar.
21, 2007); Jan de Nul NV and Dredging International NV v Egypt, ICSID Case No.
ARB/04/13, Decision on Jurisdiction June 16, 2006); Noble Energy Inc. and
MachalaPower Cia Ltd v. Ecuador and Consejo Nacional de Electricidad, ICSID Case No.
ARB/05/12, Decision on Jurisdiction (Mar. 5 2008); Joy Mining Machinery Ltd v. Egypt,
ICSID Case No. ARB/03/11, Award on Jurisdiction (uly 30, 2004); Mitchell v. The
Democratic Republic of the Congo, ICSID Case No. ARB/99/7, Decision on the
Application for Annulment of the Award (Oct. 27, 2006); Inmaris Perestroika Sailing
Maritime Services GmbH and ors v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/8, Decision on
Jurisdiction (Mar. 8, 2010); Bureau V eritas, Inspection, V aluation, Assessment and Control,
BINAC BN V. Paraguay, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/9, Decision on Objection to
Jurisdiction (May 29, 2009); Pantechniki SA Contractors and Engineers v. Albania, ICSID
Case No. ARB/07/21, Award (July 28, 2009); Fakes v. Turkey, ICSID Case No.
ARB/07/20, Award (July 12, 2010); Abaclat and ors v. Argentina, ICSID Case No.
ARB/07/5, Decision on Jurisdiction and Admissibility (Aug. 4, 2011); Societe Generale v.
Dominican Republic, LCIA Case No. UN 7927, Award on Preliminary Objections to
Jurisdiction (Sept. 2008); Romak SA v. Uzbekistan, Award, PCA Case No. AA280 (Nov.
26, 2009); Consortium RFCC v. Morocco, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/6, Decision on
Jurisdiction (uly 16, 2001); Ceskoslovenska Obchodni Banka As (CSOB) v. Slovakia,
ICSID Case No. ARB/97/4, Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction 2 (May 24, 1999);
Alpha Projektholding GMBH v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/16, Award (Oct. 20,
2010); Phoenix Action Ltd. v. Czech Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/5, Award (Apr.
9, 2009); ]Malicorp Ltd. v. Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/18, Award (Jan. 31, 2011);
Global Trading Resource Corp and Globex International Inc. v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No.
ARB/09/11, Award (Nov. 23, 2010); Lemire v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/18,
Decision on Jurisdiction and Liability Jan. 14, 2010); F-W Oil Interests Inc. v. Trinidad
and Tobago, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/14, Award (Feb. 2006); RSM Production
Corporation v. Grenada, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/14, Award (Mfar. 11, 2009); Consorzio
Groupement LESI and ASTALDI v. Algeria, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/3, Decision on
Jurisdiction Jily 12, 2006); Toto Costruzioni Generali SpA v. Lebanon, ICSID Case No.
ARB/07/12, Decision on Jurisdiction (Sept. 8, 2009); Kardassopoulos v. Georgia, ICSID
Case No. ARB/05/18, Decision on jurisdiction Uuly 6, 2007); Alps Finance and Trade AG
v. Slovakia, Award (Ad hoc arbitration) (Mar. 5, 2011); Mytilineos Holdings SA v. Serbia
and Montenegro, Partial Award on Jurisdiction, UNCITRAL (Sept. 8, 2006).
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investment treaty ("BIT") definition of an investment. 12 Less than a third of these
tribunals held that an investment did not exist within the meaning of an
investment treaty or Article 25 of the ICSID Convention (often, these tribunals
followed the double-barrel method), because the development "criterion" had not
been met.13 Among the arbitral awards that found in favour of the existence of an
investment, there is a greater preponderance of arbitral tribunals rejecting the Salini
test, and instead treating "economic development" as a descriptive characteristic or
feature of investment that should be considered with other interdependent
characteristics or features. The differences in reasoning between tribunals that have
accepted development as a "criterion" or "condition", and those that saw it as a
descriptive characteristic or feature of investment, can be seen below.
A. Development as a KecogniZed "Crteron" or "Condition"
Sole arbitrator Michael Hwang, S.C. in Malaysia Jdistorical Salvors held that, a
contribution to the host State's development is a strict requirement for the
transactions therein to qualify as an "investment" within the meaning of both the
investment treaty and Article 25 of the ICSID Convention. 14 After surveying seven
arbitral awards that dealt with the development aspect of the Salini test, he
concluded:
The Tribunal considers that the weight of the authorities cited
above swings in favour of requiring a significant contribution to be
made to the host State's economy. Were there not the requirement
of significance, any contract which enhances the Gross Domestic
Product of an economy by any amount, however small, would
qualify as an "investment".... The Tribunal therefore considers
that, on the present facts, for it to constitute an "investment"
12 Mytilineos Holdings SA v. Serbia and Montenegro, Partial Award on Jurisdiction,
UNCITRAL (Sept. 8, 2006); Societe Generale v. Dominican Republic, LCIA Case No. UN
7927, Award on Preliminary Objections to Jurisdiction (Sept. 19, 2008); Romak SA v.
Uzbekistan, Award, PCA Case No. AA280 (Nov. 26, 2009); Romak SA v. Uzbekistan,
Award, PCA Case No. AA280 (Nov. 26, 2009).
13 Joy3 Mining Machinery Ltd v. Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/11, Award on
Jurisdiction (July 30, 2004); Mitchell v. The Democratic Republic of the Congo, ICSID
Case No. ARB/99/7, Decision on the Application for Annulment of the Award (Oct. 27,
2006); Romak SA v. Uzbekistan, Award, PCA Case No. AA280 (Nov. 26, 2009); Global
Trading Resource Corp and Globex International Inc. v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No.
ARB/09/11, Award (Nov. 23, 2010); F-W Oil Interests Inc. v. Trinidad and Tobago,
ICSID Case No. ARB/01/14, Award (Feb. 20, 2006); Alps Finance and Trade AG v.
Slovakia, Award (Ad hoc arbitration) (March 5, 2011).
14 Malaysia Historical Salvors Sdn Bhd v. Malaysia, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/10,
Award on Jurisdiction (May 17, 2007).
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under the ICSID Convention, the Contract must have made a
significant contribution to the economic development of the
Respondent.'
The sole arbitrator found that the salvage operation, which was the subject of
the contract in the above case, did not make any significant contribution to
Malaysia's economic development. He further stressed the importance of an
economic "impact" assessment when testing this criterion for purposes of
determining the existence of an investment:
Not every contract entered into with a sovereign state will have a
positive impact on the economic development of the host State in
the sense envisaged under the ICSID Convention. Although the
Contract was directly entered into by the Claimant with the
Respondent, that does not lpso facto make the Contract an
"investment" within the ICSID Convention. The economic impact
of the benefits of the Contract must be assessed to determine
whether there was an "investment." Accordingly, the Tribunal
must reject any perceived political or cultural benefits arising from
the Contract in assessing whether it constituted an "investment"
except where such benefits would have had a significant impact on
the Respondent's economic development. Stripped of all political
and cultural benefits arising from the Contract, the Tribunal must
assess whether the benefits arising from the Contract were simply a
commercial benefit arising from the Contract or whether the
Contract provided a significant contribution to the Respondent's
economy.16
Applying the above test, the sole arbitrator concluded that the benefits
flowing from the salvage contract "were no different from the benefits flowing to
the place of the performance of any normal service contract. The benefit was not
lasting, in the sense envisaged in the public infrastructure or banking
infrastructure projects. The submission that historical marine salvage contracts
could lead to a thriving tourism industry appears speculative."" The salvage
contract was not like a "public infrastructure or banking infrastructure
project... [that] could provide positive economic development to the host State"."
However, the ad hoc committee later annulled these findings and rejected the sole
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criterion or condition to qualify as an investment under the BIT and Article 25 of
the ICSID Convention.
While accepting development as a criterion or condition for determining the
existence of an investment, other tribunals have not been as detailed or stringent
in their application as the sole arbitrator demonstrated in Malagsia Historical Salvor.
In most of these cases, the arbitral tribunals have generally recognized public
infrastructure projects to meet the development criterion. For instance, the
arbitral tribunal in Consortium RFCC v. Morocco did not dwell at length on this
criterion even as it recognized that it was met: "as far as the market contribution
to the economic development of the Moroccan State is concerned, this cannot be
seriously discussed... the motorway in question will serve public interest... [and
the] Consortium was also in a position to bring its know-how in connection with
the work to be carried out to the State receiving the investment."19 A similar
finding with respect to a highway construction contract was made by the arbitral
tribunal in Bayindir Insaat Turkm Ticaret Pe Sanavi A S v. Pakistan, where it noted
that Pakistan's own authorities had repeatedly declared that the project positively
contributed to the country's economic development. 20 The arbitral tribunal in Toto
Costruioni Generali SpA v. Lebanon also applied development as a criterion, and
held that this criterion was met by the contract for the construction of a portion
of the Arab Highway linking Beirut to Damascus, as it was a "major construction
work that will facilitate land transportation between Lebanon, Syria and other
Arab countries and thus increase Lebanon's position as a transit country for
goods from and to Middle East countries". 21
Other types of public projects, such as utilities and concessions, have also
been found to readily satisfy the development criterion. For instance, a joint
venture agreement involving interests in an oil and gas concession in Georgia was
19 Consortium RFCC v. Morocco, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/6, Decision on
Jurisdiction T 65 (Tuy 16, 2001).
2() Bayindir Insaat Turizm Ticaret ve Sanavi A S v. Pakistan, ICSID Case No.
ARB/03/29, Decision on Jurisdiction T 137 (Nov. 14, 2005)
"...relying on the preamble of the ICSID Convention, ICSID
tribunals generally consider that, to qualify as an investment, the project
must represent a significant contribution to the host State's development.
In other words, investment should be significant to the State's
development. As stated by the tribunal in L.E.S.I., often this condition is
already included in the three classical conditions set out in the Salini test.
In any event, in the present case, Pakistan did not challenge the numerous
declarations of its own authorities emphasizing the importance of road
infrastructure for the development of the country."
21 Toto Costruzioni Generali SpA v. Lebanon, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/12, Decision
on Jurisdiction T 86 (Sept. 8, 2009).
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found by the arbitral tribunal in Kardassopoulos v. Georgia to be "intended to
contribute to Georgia's economic development". 22 The arbitral tribunal in Helnan
International Hotels A/S v. Eg)pt held that the refurbishment of a hotel to transform
it into a five-star luxury hotel in Egypt's prime commercial and business district
made an "obvious" contribution to the tourism of Egypt, by extension, the
economic development of Egypt.2 3 The arbitral tribunal in Saem SpA v.
Bangladesh found that a contract to construct a gas and condensate pipeline
entailed a "significant contribution in terms of both technical and human
resources... [Bangladesh did not] dispute that these resources contributed to its
economic development". 24 The arbitral tribunal in Jan de Nul NV and Dredging
International NV v. EDpt had little trouble finding that a joint venture agreement
for dredging operations in the Suez Canal was of "paramount significance for
Egypt's economy and development",'25 as did the arbitral tribunal in Noble Energy
Inc. and Machala P1ower Ca Ltd. v. Ecuador and Consejo Nacional de Electricidad, in
relation to a 31-year concession contract authorizing the claimant investment
company to generate and own the electricity it generated. 26 Even outlays for
22 Kardassopoulos v. Georgia, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/18, Decision on Jurisdiction
TT 116-117 uly 6, 2007).
23 Helnan International Hotels A/S v. Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/19, Decision
of the Tribunal on Objection to Jurisdiction 77 (Oct. 17, 2006):
The Arbitral Tribunal is satisfied that the dispute arises directly out of an
investment. It disagrees with the Respondent's view that the Contract
can solely be 'a standard commercial agreement featuring ordinary
commercial terms, regulating the management of an unremarkable
property of no particular consequence on the Host State's development.'
The Arbitral Tribunal accepts the Respondent's suggestion, based on
ICSID precedents, as summarized in the unchallenged statement by Prof
Ch. Schreuer, that to be characterized as an investment a project 'must
show a certain duration, a regularity of profit and return, an element of
risk, a substantial commitment, and a significant contribution to the host
State's development.' But the Arbitral Tribunal also agrees with the
Claimant that the Contract meets these requirements. Twenty six years is
definitely a 'certain duration', the Claimant's activity was supposed to
provide it with a regular remuneration, refurbishing the Shepheard Hotel
to transform it into a five-stars hotel implied the risk of no commercial
success and the amount of money necessary to achieve that goal and keep
such classification for years qualifies as a substantial commitment. As for
the contribution to the development of Egypt, the importance of the
tourism industry in the Egyptian economy makes it obvious.
24 Saipem SpA v. Bangladesh, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/07, Decision on jurisdiction
and recommendation on provisional measures T 101 (-Mar. 21, 2007).
25 Jan de Nul NV and Dredging International NV v. Egypt, ICSID Case No.
ARB/04/13, Decision on Jurisdiction T 92 June 16, 2006).
26 Noble Energy Inc. and Machala Power Cia Ltd. v. Ecuador and Consejo Nacional
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improving the host State's banking infrastructure were deemed sufficient to satisfy
the development criterion in Ceskoslovenska Obchodni Banka As (CSOB) V. Slovakia.27
Though other tribunals have not explicitly named the Salini test, they
nevertheless appear to apply development as a criterion to the facts of the case
before them. The arbitral tribunal in Abaclat and ors P. Argentina did precisely this in
their August 2011 Decision on Jurisdiction: "[t]here is no doubt that funds
generated through the bonds issuance process were ultimately made available to
Argentina, and served to finance Argentina's economic development. Whether the
funds were actually used to repay pre-existing debts of Argentina or whether they
were used in government spending is irrelevant. In both cases, it was used by
Argentina to manage its finances, and as such must be considered to have
contributed to Argentina's economic development and thus to have been made in
Argentina."28 Even the arbitral tribunal in a non-ICSID case, Societe Generale v.
Dominican Republic (which dealt with a complex financial structure involving the
claimant's participation through various corporate vehicles as a general partner of
Dominican Energy Holdings LP in the upstream segment of the investment, and
the purchaser of shares in the downstream segment), appeared to recognize and
apply economic development as a criterion of investment within the BIT
definition: 29 "[t]he issue of the specific contribution made to the local economy by
a transaction of this kind might not be as easy to identify as if a factory was built,
but this of course does not disqualify financial investments from protection under
the Treaty. The Claimant has convincingly identified as part of such contribution
the continuing supply of electricity, the improvement of distribution and the
contribution to employment within the country... "3o
Some tribunals have also recognized development as a criterion, but
subsequently concluded that certain transactions, activities, or operations failed to
meet this criterion. In Jqy Mining Machine, Ltd. P. BDpt, the arbitral tribunal found
that letters of guarantee for contract performance, advance payment, and the
remaining balance payment did not qualify as an investment under the Salin test,
finding that while "the amount of the price and of the bank guarantees is
relatively substantial, as is probably the contribution to the development of the
mining operation.. it is only a small fraction of the Project. Certainly, there is
de Electricidad, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/12, Decision on Jurisdiction T 132 (Mar. 5,
2008).
27 Ceskoslovenska Obchodni Banka As (CSOB) v. Slovakia, ICSID Case No.
ARB/97/4, Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction (May 24, 1999).
28 Abaclat and ors v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5, Decision on Jurisdiction
and Admissibility T 378 (Aug. 4, 2011).
29 Societe Generale v. Dominican Republic, LCIA Case No. UN 7927, Award on
Preliminary Objections to Jurisdiction TT 16, 30, 25 (Sept. 19, 2008).
30 Id. 35.
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nothing here to be compared with the concept of 'contrats de developpement
economique' or even contracts entailing the concession of public services."31 The ad
hoc committee's annulment decision in Mitchell v. The Democratic Republic of Congo
took a broad view of the development criterion, holding that "[i]t suffices for the
operation to contribute in one way or another to the economic development of
the host State, and this concept of economic development is, in any event,
extremely broad but also variable depending on the case."3 2 However, the
committee did not find anything in the award to show that this criterion was
sufficiently satisfied: "[a]s a legal consulting firm is a somewhat uncommon
operation from the standpoint of the concept of investment, in the opinion of the
ad hoc Committee, it is necessary for the contribution to the economic
development or at least the interests of the State, in this case the DRC, to be
somehow present in the operation....the Award itself is actually mute on this
issue."33
B. Development ai a Desitive Characteristic or Non-Binding Feature of Investment
Where development is predominantly viewed as a descriptive characteristic or
non-binding feature of investment, it has been suggested that the Salini test could
have a narrow residual function for extreme cases involving goods, activities or
services not traditionally associated with investment activities. The 2010 award in
Inmaris Perestroika Sailing Maritime Services GmbH and ors v. Ukraine ("Inmari")
significantly declared that "[t]he Salini test may be useful in the event that a
tribunal were concerned that a BIT or contract definition was so broad that it
might appear to capture a transaction that would not rightly be characterized as an
investment under any reasonable definition. These elements could be useful in
identifying such aberrations." 34 The Inmaris arbitral tribunal deferred to the BIT
definition of investment rather than the Salini test; but it also declared in obiter
that "to the extent that showing a 'contribution to the economic development of
the host State' were required in this case, the Tribunal is satisfied that the
requirement is met by the alleged investments here. The Inmaris Companies'
renovation and operation of the Khersones through the Bareboat Charter and
related contracts provided benefits directly to the Ukrainian state that it could not
otherwise afford - namely, a rehabilitated state asset (the Khersones) - and provided
valuable training for thousands of Ukrainian cadets."35 The arbitral tribunal in
31 Joy Mining Machiner Ltd. v. Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/11, Award on
Jurisdiction, T 57 (July 30, 2004).
32 Mitchell v. The Democratic Republic of the Congo, ICSID Case No. ARB/99/7,
Decision on the Application for Annulment of the Award T 33 (Oct. 27, 2006).
3 Id. T 39.
34 Inmaris Perestroika Sailing Maritime Services GmbH and ors v. Ukraine, ICSID
Case No. ARB/08/8, Decision on Jurisdiction, T 131 (Mar. 8, 2010).
35 Id. T 132. The same tribunal further noted that the state willingly participated in and
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Bureau Vertas, Inspection, Valuation, Assessment and Control, BIVAC BV v. Paraguay
likewise referred to the development contribution not as a strict condition but
merely in the alternative sense, when it declared that a contract for the provision
of technical services for pre-shipment inspect of imports into Paraguay
constituted an "investment" within the meaning of the BIT.36
In another case, Jan Paulsson, as sole arbitrator in Pantechniki SA Contractors
and Engineers v. Albania, recognized the inherent subjective difficulties when
development is treated as a criterion, rather than as a descriptive characteristic or
feature of investment:
36. What does 'an investment' mean here? [cf. Art. 25(1) of the
ICSID Convention] Other ICSID tribunals have hesitated. A
number of tribunals have struggled with what has become known
as the Salin Test (by reference to the award in Salini v. Morocco).
This appears to be a misnomer. It is not so much a test as a list of
characteristics of investments. The Salini award identified five
elements as 'typical' of investment but made clear that the absence
of one could be compensated by a stronger presence of another.
The resulting wide margin of appreciation is unfortunate for the
reason articulated succinctly by Douglas: 'If the fundamental
objective of an investment treaty is to attract foreign capital, then
the concept of an investment cannot be one in search of meaning
in the pleadings submitted to an investment treaty tribunal that is
established years, perhaps decades, after the decision to commit
capital to the host state was made.'...
43. It comes down to this: does the word 'investment' in Article
25(1) carry some inherent meaning which is so clear that it must be
deemed to invalidate more extensive definitions of the word
'investment' in other treaties? Salin made a respectable attempt to
describe the characteristics of investments. Yet broadly acceptable
descriptions cannot be elevated to jurisdictional requirements
unless that is their explicit function. They may introduce elements
of subjective judgment on the part of arbitral tribunals (such as
'sufficient' duration or magnitude or contribution to economic
directly benefited from the bareboat charter arrangements and related contracts, leading to
a cost of renovation and repair of the state asset amounting to approximately EUR 550,000
( 133).
36 Bureau Veritas, Inspection, Valuation, Assessment and Control, BIVAC BV v.
Paraguay, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/9, Decision on Objection to Jurisdiction, TT 82, 83,
94, 96 (May 29, 2009).
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development) which (a) transform arbitrators into policy-makers
and above all (b) increase unpredictability about the availability of
ICSID to settle given disputes.
Accordingly, the sole arbitrator had no difficulty in finding that an investment
existed, more so since Albania "does not dispute that the Claimant committed
resources and equipment to carry out the works under the Contracts. Its own
officials have accepted that material committed to infrastructural development
was brought by the Claimant to Albania and lost there."38
Other tribunals have also expressly rejected the use of the international right
of development as a criterion determinative of the existence of an investment.
The arbitral tribunal took the position in its 2010 award in Fakes v. Turkg that
there were inherent textual problems arising from this interpretation:
111. The Tribunal is not convinced, on the other hand, that a
contribution to the host State's economic development constitutes
a criterion of an investment within the framework of the ICSID
Convention. Those tribunals that have considered this element as a
separate requirement for the definition of an investment, such as
the Salini Tribunal, have mainly relied on the preamble to the
ICSID Convention to support their conclusions. The present
Tribunal observes that while the preamble refers to the 'need for
international cooperation for economic development', it would be
excessive to attribute to this reference a meaning and function that
is not obviously apparent from its wording. In the Tribunal's
opinion, while the economic development of a host State is one of
the proclaimed objectives of the ICSID Convention, this objective
is not in and of itself an independent criterion for the definition of
an investment. The promotion and protection of investments in
host States is expected to contribute to their economic
development. Such development is an expected consequence, not a
separate requirement, of the investment projects carried out by a
number of investors in the aggregate. Taken in isolation, certain
individual investments might be useful to the State and to the
investor itself; certain might not. Certain investments expected to
be fruitful may turn out to be economic disasters. They do not fall,
for that reason alone, outside the ambit of the concept of
investment.39
3 Pantechniki SA Contractors and Engineers v. Albania, ICSID Case No.
ARB/07/21, Award, TT 36, 43 (July 28, 2009).
38 Id. T 48.
3 Fakes v. Turkey, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/20, Award, T 111 July 12, 2010).
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In its 2010 Award, the arbitral tribunal in Alpha Projektholding GMBH v.
Ukraine expressed similar dissatisfactions with the development criterion in the
Salini test, preferring instead to defer to the BIT definition of investment:
312. The Tribunal is particularly reluctant to apply a test that seeks
to assess an investment's contribution to a country's economic
development. Should a tribunal find it necessary to check whether
a transaction falls outside any reasonable understanding of
'investment', the criteria of resources, duration, and risk would
seem fully to serve that objective. The contribution-to-
development criterion, on the other hand, would appear instead to
reflect the consequences of the other criteria and brings little
independent content to the inquiry. At the same time, the criterion
invites a tribunal to engage in a post hoc evaluation of the
business, economic, financial and/or policy assessments that
prompted the claimant's activities. It would not be appropriate for
such a form of second-guessing to drive a tribunal's jurisdictional
analysis.
313. The Tribunal recognizes that elements discussed in the Salini
test might be of some use if a tribunal were concerned that a BIT
or contract definition of 'investment' was overreaching and
captured transactions that manifestly were not investments under
any acceptable definition. Indeed, a number of tribunals and ad
hoc committees have treated the Salini elements as non-binding,
non-exclusive means of identifying (rather than defining)
investments that are consistent with the ICSID Convention.
However, in most cases - including, in the Tribunal's view, this
one - it will be appropriate to defer to the States' definition of
investment in a BIT or a contract.40
Using the BIT's definition of investment, the arbitral tribunal then found that
the reconstruction agreements for the renovation of a historic Ukrainian hotel fell
well within the scope of the term "contribution" within the BIT definition of
investment. 41 After noting that the improved hotel became the site of many
important official functions, and higher tax revenues from increased sales by the
improved hotel operations, Alpha's participation in the joint activities for
rehabilitating the hotel were deemed to have "contributed to the development of
Ukraine and its economy".42
4 Alpha Projektholding GMBH v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/16, Award, TT
312, 313 (Oct. 20, 2010).
41 Id. TT 327-331.
42 Id. T 331.
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Other tribunals have ceased to adopt the Salini test, or even consider the
independent criterion or characteristic of development in any way, but have,
instead, subsumed their discussion of development within the context of
"contributions" to "economic activities" in the host State. In Consorio Groupement
LESI and ASTALDI v. Algeria, which involved the construction of a dam in
Algeria's Bouira district, the arbitral tribunal ultimately rejected development as a
strict criterion and instead applied it within the tribunal's assessment of
"contributions". 43 Out of the six elements of investment distilled by the arbitral
tribunal in Phoenix Action Ltd. v. Cech Republic from various ICSID awards, only
the fourth - "an operation made in order to develop an economic activity in the
host State", conceptually resembled development. 44 The tribunal stressed that
"[t]he development of economic activities must have been foreseen or intended,
but need not necessarily be successful.... although there were no significant
activities performed by the Czech companies owned by Phoenix since it acquired
them, this alone would not be sufficient to disqualify the operation as an
investment, provided that, and this caveat is fundamental, the Claimant had really
the intention to engage in economic activities, and made good faith efforts to do
so and that its failure to do so was a consequence of the State's interference."45
The tribunal went on to hold that such good faith efforts were not met, and thus
concluded that the initiation of the arbitration was "an abuse of the system of
international ICSID and investment arbitration".46
Romak SA v. U hekistan referred to investment as entailing "expenditure or
4 Consorzio Groupement LESI and ASTALDI v. Algeria, ICSID Case No.
ARB/05/3, Decision on Jurisdiction, 72-73(July 12, 2006).
44 Phoenix Action Ltd. v. Czech Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/5, Award,
114-115 (Apr. 9, 2009):
114. To summarize all the requirements for an investment to benefit
from the international protection of ICSID, the Tribunal considers that
the following six elements have to be taken into account:
1 - a contribution in money or other assets;
2 - a certain duration;
3- an element of risk;
4- an operation made in order to develop an economic activity in
the host State;
5 - assets invested in accordance with the laws of the host State;
6 - assets invested bona fide
115. The Tribunal wants to emphasize that an extensive scrutiny of
all these requirements is not always necessary, as they are most often
fulfilled on their face, 'overlapping' or implicitly contained in others, and
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contribution, as well as the purpose of obtaining an economic benefit, the
existence and extent of which is by definition, uncertain", and found that an
ordinary sale of goods contract did not satisfy the purpose of economic benefit
and contribution.47 Similar purposes of economic benefits and contributions were
articulated and considered in the 2011 Award in Malicp Ltd. v. Egypt (involving a
build-operate-transfer contract for the building of the Ras Sudr) and the 2010
Award in Global Trading Resource Cop and Globex International Inc. v. Ukraine
(involving purchase and sale contracts). The Malicrp tribunal referred to "major
contributions" to the economy,48 while the Global Trading arbitral tribunal
emphasized that attenuated contributions to the host State economy would not
qualify as an investment: "[the fact that the trade in these particular goods was
seen to further the policy priorities of the purchasing State does not bring about a
qualitative change in the economic benefit that all legitimate trade brings in its
train." 49
RSM Production Corporation P. Grenada accepted that the exploration stage of an
oil project, taken in its totality, could comprise an investment given its overall or
collective contribution to the host State's economy: "[a]s to the contribution to
the economic and social development of the host State, in the unlikely situation
where the exploration expenses themselves would not be sufficient to satisfy it,
the condition must be assessed in consideration of a successful adventure.. .the
project embodied in the Agreement was an 'overall adventure' from the execution
of the instrument by the Parties.""
Some arbitral tribunals have also used development to support the balance of
interests between host States and investors, without being dispositive to the
arbitral tribunal's resolution of the dispute. In Lemire v. Ukraine, the arbitral
tribunal took the opportunity to explain the concept of economic development,
but without referring to the Salini test. The tribunal did not use the international
right of development as a means to identify qualified investments pursuant to a
BIT definition or Article 25 of the ICSID Convention, but rather recognized its
policy function in the interpretation of investor and host State rights:
273. ... [E]conomic development is an objective which must
benefit all, primarily national citizens and national companies, and
secondarily foreign investors. Thus, the object and purpose of the
47 Romak SA v. Uzbekistan, PCA Case No. AA280, TT 206, 222 (Nov. 26, 2009).
48 Malicorp Ltd. v. Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/18, Award, T 113 (Jan. 31, 2011).
49 Global Trading Resource Corp and Globex International Inc. v. Ukraine, ICSID
Case No. ARB /09 /11, Award (Nov. 23, 2010).
5o RSIM Production Corporation v. Grenada, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/14, Award, TT
244, 264 (Mar. 11, 2009).
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Treaty is not to protect foreign investments per se, but as an aid to
the development of the domestic economy. And local
development requires that the preferential treatment of foreigners
be balanced against the legitimate right of Ukraine to pass
legislation and adopt measures for the protection of what as a
sovereign it perceives to be its public interest.51
Clearly, outside of the sole arbitrator's findings in Malaysia Historical Salvors, no
other arbitral tribunal has stringently regarded "contributions to the host State's
economic development" as a rigid criterion. Neither has any other tribunal
attempted to undertake any verifiable assessment of such contributions, other
than to generally acknowledge direct or indirect linkages between the investment
and improvements in the national economy through income growth, employment,
tax revenues, and other similar economic benefits. Investment "aberrations"
which, as the Inmans tribunal suggested, are more proper subjects for the
application of the Salini test - and development as a criterion have not yet been
concretely demonstrated in investment arbitral jurisprudence.
The irony in debating the use of development as either a criterion or a mere
descriptive characteristic is that, in actual arbitral practice, the majority of arbitral
tribunals to date have had little difficulty finding that a given transaction,
operanon, or activity indeed contributes to a host State's economic development.
If every such transaction, operation, or activity arguably redounds to the host
State's economic development, the more relevant question should thus be the
magnitude of the contribution to economic development as would be deemed
sufficient to constitute such transaction, operation, or activity as a covered
"investment" within the meaning of the BIT definition and Article 25 of the
ICSID Convention. But as the experience of the sole arbitrator in Malaysia
Historcal Salvors shows us, the method for this assessment proved empirically
unwieldy, if not quite unscientific; it may thus be futile for arbitral tribunals to
address this question.
If arbitral tribunals could establish and identify the bare nexus of
contributions to the host State's economy, albeit not having the wherewithal to
precisely estimate the extent of such contributions, there would seem to be little,
if any, value in perpetuating the Salini test's strict insistence on development as a
jurisdictional criterion to comply with the double-barrelled test of the BIT
definition of investment and Article 25 of the ICSID Convention. The rare cases
or "aberrations" where activities not usually associated with investment (such as
legal consulting services in Mitchell v. The Democratic Republic of Congo) are argued to
51 Lemire v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/18, Decision on Jurisdiction and
Liability, T 273 (Jan. 14, 2010).
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be investments within the meaning of the BIT, IIA, or Article 25 of the ICSID
Convention, would more likely form the outer margin of situations where the
development criterion in the Salini test might prove salient. However, it is not too
clear what these "aberrations" could be under the more evolved climate of
contemporary investment activities.
As will be shown in Part III, new asset-based formulations or enumerations
of investment now broadly encompass services, rights and choses in action, debt
and equity participation. If the Salini test were to be applied by future arbitral
tribunals to these new forms of investment, there should be a corresponding
asset-based differentiation in how they assess the impact or "contributions to
economic development" of these forms of investment. The inherent ambiguity of
the international right of development, as well as the proliferation of different
methods for its empirical assessment, further militates against inducing arbitral
tribunals to use the development right as a criterion of jurisdictional gatekeeping
in international investment arbitrations. Significantly, the United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development (UTNCTAD)'s own recommendations on
enhancing development within the IIAs does not focus on imposing the
development criterion on the meaning of investment, but on other more
"proactive" means:
A final critical issue is how best to strengthen the development
dimension of IIAs... to the extent that the development dimension
is addressed in international investment rulemaking, it is done in an
indirect manner and in a pnmanj defensive mode, in order to shield
contracting parties permanently or temporarily from assuming their full
reiponsibilities under the agreement... Incorporating a proactive
development dimension would require adding new kinds of
provisions not often seen in IIAs, including home country
measures. Such means could include a broad range of issues: (a)
transparency and exchange of investment-related information; (b)
fostering linkages between foreign investors and domestic
companies; (c) capacity-building and technical assistance; (d)
granting of investment insurance; (e) encouragement of transfer of
technology; (f easing informal investment obstacles; (g) joint
investment protection activities; (h) access to capital; (i) financial
and fiscal incentives; and (j) the setting up of an institutional
mechanism to coordinate the respective measures... 52
52 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Development
implications of International Investment Agreements, IIA Monitor No. 2 (2007), p. 7.
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In the absence of a reliable method for estimating "contributions to the host
State's economic development", applying the development criterion could be
rightly criticized as a form of arbitrator-arbitrariness. Thus, because arbitrators
would prefer to act prudently rather than superimpose an empirically-
unsupported (and often tentative) assessment upon the parties to an investment
dispute, it can be anticipated that most arbitrators confronted with the question of
development in relation to the treaty definition of investment and Article 25 of
the ICSID Convention, would more likely find that a transaction, operation, or
activity contributes directly or indirectly to the host State's economy, without
requiring the contribution to be of any precise degree. In this sense, the
international right of development appears to be of little practical value for
arbitrators seeking to isolate the activities, operations, and transactions that should
(rightly) be kept out of the protections of a BIT or IIA, including access to ICSID
jurisdiction.
III. DEVELOPMENT AS AN INTERNATIONAL RIGHT: THEORIES AND
ASSESSMENTS
A. The International Right of Development
The sheer breadth of the concept of development, the mutability of its
content, and the diversity in the methods and policies for achieving development,
have not necessarily prevented its recognition as an international right. In 1986,
the General Assembly of the United Nations issued the landmark Declaration on the
Right to Development ("Declaration").5 3  In this Declaration, the right to
development was defined as "an inalienable human right by virtue of which every
human person and all peoples are entitled to participate in, contribute to, and
enjoy economic, social, cultural and political development, in which all human
rights and fundamental freedoms can be fully realized". 54 The same right has been
expressly extended to the exercise of the "inalienable right to full sovereignty over
all natural wealth and resources". 55 Accordingly, the Declaration imposes primary
duties on States to: (1) "formulate appropriate national development policies that
aim at the constant improvement of the well-being of the entire population and of
all individuals, on the basis of their active, free and meaningful participation in
development and in the fair distribution of the benefits resulting therefrom"; 5 6 (2)
create "national and international conditions favourable to the realization of the
5 Declaration on the Right to Development, G.A. Res. 41/128, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/41/128 (Dec. 4 1986), available at: http://www2.ohcht.org/english/law/rtd.htm
(last visited Aug. 15, 2011).
54 Id. art. 1(1).
55 Id. art. 1(2).
56 Id. art. 2(3).
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right to development";5 (3) "co-operate with each other in ensuring development
and eliminating obstacles to development...promote a new international
economic order based on sovereign equality, interdependence, mutual interest and
co-operation among all States as well as to encourage the observance and
realization of human rights";58 (4) "take steps, individually and collectively, to
formulate international development policies with a view to facilitating the full
realization of the right to development";59 (5) "take resolute steps to eliminate the
massive and flagrant violations of the human rights of peoples and human beings
affected by situations such as those resulting from apartheid , all forms of racism
and racial discrimination, colonialism, foreign domination and occupation,
aggression, foreign interference and threats against national sovereignty, national
unity and territorial integrity, threats of war and refusal to recognize the
fundamental right of peoples to self-determination";o and (6) "undertake, at the
national level, all necessary measures for the realization of the right to
development". 61 All of these aspects of the right to development are "indivisible
and interdependent and each of them should be considered in the context of the
whole". 62
B. Justiciabili of the International Right of Development
The exact content and justiciability of the international right to development,
admittedly, remains much debated. 63 The late Arjun Sengupta, Independent
Expert on the Right to Development to the Human Rights Commission,
acknowledged the conceptual breadth of the right to development, and
synthesized the right according to four main propositions of the Declaration:
"...(A) The right to development is a human right. (B) The human
right to development is a right to a particular process of
development in which all human rights and fundamental freedoms
can be fully realized-which means that it combines all the rights
enshrined in both the covenants and each of the rights has to be
exercised with freedom. (C) The meaning of exercising these rights
consistently with freedom implies free, ejfective, and fullparticipation of
all the individuals concerned in the decision-making and the
57 Id. art. 3(1).
58 Id. art. 3(3). See Arts. 6-7.
59 Id. art. 4(1).
60 Id. art. 5.
61 Id. art. 8.
62 Id. art. 9.
63 See Philip Alston, Making Space for New Human Rights: The Case of the Right to
Development, 1 I-ARV. HUNT. RTS. Y.B. 3, 20-24 & 33-38 (1988) (hereinafter Alston); Brigitte
I. Hamm,A Human Rights Approach to Development, 23(4) HUNT. RTs. Q. 1005, 1009 (2001).
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implementation of the process. Therefore, the process must be
transparent and accountable, individuals must have equal opportunity
of access to the resources for development and receive fair
distribution of the benefits of development (and income). (D)
Finally, the right confers unequivocal obligation on duty-holders:
individuals in the community, states at the national level, and states
at the international level. National states have the responsibility to
help realize the process of development through appropriate
development policies. Other states and international agencies have
the obligation to cooperate with the national states to facilitate the
realization of the process of development. 64
Notwithstanding the growth of the right to development in the international
legal framework, the legal enforceability of the right to development has not
gained much traction yet among international legal scholars. When anchored only
in the Declaration, the right to development is regarded as "soft law", but the
right can be deemed part of "hard law" when read in conjunction with legally
enforceable treaties such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights65 and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural
Rights66.67
In 1988, international human rights expert Philip Alston clarified that the
binding nature of international human rights such as the right to development did
not depend on its justiciability or enforceability, as much of international human
rights law adopts the "notions of 'implementation' and 'supervision' as its
touchstones, rather than that of justiciability or enforceability. 68 That is to say that
rights once recognized, are to be implemented or given effect. Depending on the
nature of the rights, the terms of the instrument and the factual circumstances,
64 Arjun Sengupta, The Rght to Development as a Human Rght, (unpublished paper)
available at: http://www.harvardfxbcenter.org/resources/working-papers/FXBC WP7--
Sengupta.pdf (last visited Aug. 15, 2011).
65 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, GA Res. 2200A (XXI), 21 UN
GAOR Supp. No. 16 U.N. Doc. A/6316, at 52 (1966); 999 U.N.T.S. 171; 6 I.L.M. 368
(1967).
66 International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A
(XXI), 21 UN GAOR Supp. No. 16 U.N. Doc. A/6316, at 49 (1966); 993 U.N.T.S. 3; 6
I.L.M. 368 (1967).
67 See Felix Kirchmeier, The Right to Development - Where do we stand? State of the
Debate on the Right to Development, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Dialogue on Globalization
Occasional Papers No. 23, at 11-12 (July 2006), available at: http://ibrary,.fes.de/pdf-
files/iez/ global/ 50288.pdf (last visited Aug. 15, 2011).
68 See Alston, supra note 63.
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that requirement may or may not translate into the need for judicial remedies." 69
Nevertheless, Alston also recognized that the Declaration "clearly represents a
step towards satisfying the first of the relevant requirements in General Assembly
resolution 41/20, but nevertheless falls short of doing so completely. Further
precision as to the rights and obligations which are entailed is clearly required."70
Arjun Sengupta also accepts that the Declaration does not constitute "hard law",
but he nevertheless clarifies that the justiciability paradigm is, in the first place,
conceptually inappropriate for determining the binding legal quality of the
international right to development:
Another criticism of the right to development is related to its
justiciability. There is a view, particularly among lawyers of the
positivist school, that if certain rights are not legally enforceable,
they cannot be regarded as human rights. At best, they can be
regarded as social aspirations or statements of objectives. The
skeptics, who doubt the appeal and effectiveness of ethical
standards of rights-based arguments, would not consider a right to
be taken seriously unless the entitlements of those rights are
sanctioned by a legal authority, such as the state, based on
appropriate legislation. As Sen puts it, these skeptics would say,
"Human beings in nature are, in this view, no more born with
human rights than they are born fully clothed; rights would have to
be acquired through legislation, just as clothes are acquired through
tailoring." This view, however, confuses human rights with legal
rights. Human rights precede law and are derived not from law but
from the concept of human dignity. There is nothing in principle
to prevent a right being an internationally recognized human right
even if it is not individually justiciable.
Human rights can be fulfilled in many different ways depending on
the acceptability of the ethical base of the claims. This should not,
of course, obfuscate the importance or usefulness of such human
rights translated into legislated legal rights. In fact, every attempt
should be made to formulate and adopt appropriate legislative
instruments to ensure the realization of the claims of a human
right once it is accepted through consensus. These rights would
then be backed by justiciable claims in courts and by authorities of
enforcement. But to say that human rights cannot be invoked if
they cannot be legally enforced would be most inappropriate. For
many of the economic and social rights and the right to
69 Id.
7o Id. at 37.
318 [Vol. 3: 296
Development in HAs
development, and even for some elements of civil and political
rights, the positive actions that are necessary may often make it
very difficult to identify precisely the obligations of particular duty-
holders to make them legally liable to be prosecuted. Enacting
appropriate legislative instruments for any of these rights would
often be a monumental task, and it would be often useful and
necessary to find alternative methods of enforcement of the
obligations rather than through the courts of law.
.... [A]1though civil and political rights and economic, social, and
cultural rights have been codified in international treaties or
covenants and ratified by a large number of countries, the
Declaration does not have that status, and therefore cannot be
enforced in a legal system. That still does not detract from the
responsibility of states, nationally or internationally, as well as of
other individuals and agencies of the international community to
realize the right to development. It may be necessary to suggest
some mechanism to monitor or exercise surveillance over the
states and the agencies of the international community to ensure
that they are complying with their commitment to realize the right
to development. That mechanism might not have the same legal
status as a treaty body but may still be effective in ensuring the
realization of this right through peer pressure, democratic
persuasion and the commitment of civil society.71
Significantly, it has been argued that the right to development has policy
implications for international economic law, specifically for vindicating key
principles of respect for human rights, participation rights, equality of
opportunity, the differential treatment of developing countries, and accountability
in the course of interpretation and implementation of international economic
obligations.72 None of these proposals call for internationalized judicial remedies
(or legal enforceability or justiciability) to adjudicate the international right to
development. As with the views expressed by Alston and Sengupta, the
implementation of the international right to development within international
economic law thus appears to be primarily a task for State supervision and
international monitoring.73
71 Arjun Sengupta, On the Theor and Practice of the Rght to Development, 24(4) Hu M. RI's.
Q. 837, 846 & 859-861 (2002).
2 Isabella Bunn, The Right to Development: Implications /or International Economic Law, 15
AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 1425, 1442-1451 (1999-2000).
73 See also James C.N. Paul, The United Nations and the Creation of an International Law of
Development, 36 ILNRV. INT'L L.J. 307-328 (1995).
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C Measuring Economic Development
Considering the evolving ideologies on the meaning and content of the right
to development, it is unsurprising that the methods for measuring economic
development are numerous and diverse. Barbara Ingham describes development
"as a goal toward which countries strive, and also a process which involves causal
relationships".74 Her analysis surveys the historical evolution of the meaning of
economic development, examining the arguments of institutional economics (which
"stresses the importance of institutions to economic growth and to the diffusion
of growth throughout society"75); mercantilist economics (which "raises the question
of the degree to which development can be identified with industrialization"76);
development economics ("who argue that we should explore the possibilities of
'decoupling' growth from development and modernization"n); political change theoy
(which stresses "the importance of pressing for changes in international
institutions so that they become more responsive to policies which aim to
promote global development"71); decentrali Zation and partiipation theory (which is
seen "as a means of promoting democracy by enfranchising the economically
weak"79); redistribution and basic needs theoy (which mandates that income growth,
structural change, industrialization and modernization should be augmented "by
broader considerations of income distribution, poverty, and basic needs""); human
development theory (which looks to a "people-oriented view of development" 81);
sustainable development theopy (which focuses on conservation of resources, or refers
to "increases in per capita income which can be maintained without encountering
inflation and balance of payments problems" 82); and capabilities-driven development
theopy (which "builds on an agreed notion of a 'just society' and 'basic needs' for a
minimum acceptable level of living" 3).
Considering these ideological differences on the constitutive elements of
economic development, there have also been numerous empirical methods for its
measurement, focusing on gross national product ("GNP") per capita, social and
health indicators, income distributions, economic growth rates, among others.84
7 Barbara Ingham, The Meaning of Development: Interactions Between 'New' and 'Old' Ideas,
21(11) WORLD DEv. 1803, 1803 (1993).
Id. at 1805.
76 Id. at 1806.
n Id. at 1807.
78 Id. at 1808.
7 Id. at 1810.
so0 Id. at 1811.
"I Id. at 1813.
82 Id. at 1815.
83 Id. at 1817.
84 See Norman Hicks & Paul Streeten, Indicators of Development: The Search for a Basic Needs
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In 1990, the United Nations Development Programme ("UNDP") introduced the
Human Development Index ("HDI") in its first Human Development Report,
which has since provided the benchmark empirical method for measuring human
development, defined as "a process of enlarging people's choices. The most
critical ones are to lead a long and healthy life, to be educated, and to enjoy a
decent standard of living. Additional choices include political freedom, guaranteed
human rights and self-respect - what Adam Smith calls the ability to mix with
others without 'being ashamed to appear in public"'.85 HDI measurement results
in a single statistic for each country, which is a composite of three indicators - life
expectancy rates (to measure longevity), literacy rates (to measure educational
attainment), and per capita income (to measure access to resources):
This Report has chosen three types of deprivation as the focus of
attention: people's deprivation in life expectancy, literacy and
income for a decent living standard. Each measure could have
been further refined, especially by making distributional
adjustments if there had been adequate comparable data....
The first two indicators -life expectancy and adult literacy are
commonly used concepts. But the third - the purchasing power to
buy commodities for satisfying basic needs - is not as well
understood. The GNP figures typically used for international
comparisons do not adequately account for national differences in
purchasing power or the distorting effect of official exchange rates.
To overcome these inadequacies, we use here the purchasing-
power-adjusted GDP estimates developed in the Inter- national
Price Comparison Project, a collaborative effort of the UN
Statistical Office, the World Bank, EUROSTAT, OECD, ECE and
ESCAP, now being expanded by USAID. Since there are
diminishing returns in the conversion of income into the fulfilment
of human needs, the adjusted GDP per capita figures have been
transformed into their logarithms.
To construct a composite index, a minimum value (the maximum
deprivation set equal to one) and a desirable or adequate value (no
deprivation set equal to zero) had to be specified for each of the
three indicators.86
Yardstick, 7 WoiuLD D v. 567-580 (1979); J\M\I's MI. CYP1 ilI & JM\NIs L. DiFT 1, Ti i,
PROCss OF EcoNoMIc DFXLOPMIN Ch. 2 (Routledge 2004).
81 U.N.D.P. Rep., Human Development Report, 10 (1990), available at:
http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/hdr 1990_en-chapl.pdf (ast visited Aug. 15, 2011).
86 Id. at 13.
Fall, 2011 ] 321
Trade, Law and Development
These measurements of economic development are admittedly aggregated,
and do not take into account all possible socio-economic variables which do not
yet have reliable sources of empirical data. There are some methods for estimating
the actual contributions of investment to economic development, although these
are not uniform.8  However, there is no global benchmark counterpart for
investment contributions to economic development, comparable to that
contained in the HDI. Thus, while the substantive content of the international
right of development is well-established, it should be evident that the very nature
and genesis of this right - as the "sum" of international human rights - does not
lend itself easily to a formal paradigm of judicial enforceability.
Requiring arbitral tribunals to strictly assess the "contribution to a host State's
economic development" of a given transaction, operation, or activity through the
Salin test would problematically impel arbitrators to take on the roles of empirical
economists, who, even if they are better equipped with the methodological and
scientific tools for estimating the precise degree of such contributions, would
nevertheless differ among themselves as to the methods of assessment. More
importantly, as explained by Alston and Sengupta, the validity of the international
right of development was not intended in the first place to be co-dependent with
access to formal justiciability or legal enforceability before courts. Much like the
corpus of international human rights law, States' compliance with the
international right to development is a matter of monitoring and implementation,
and not expostjudicialization.8
IV. INTEGRATING DEVELOPMENT IN TRADE-BASED INVESTMENT
PROTECTION
Within the framework of international trade rules, investment protection and
regulation, and its linkages with international trade have had only some limited
recognition to date within the framework of the World Trade Organization
("WTO") Agreements. The Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures
("TRIMs") regulates potential distortions in the trade in goods arising from
certain investment measures that host States may apply. Accordingly, WTO
Member States are prohibited from applying investment measures that violate
17 See, inter alia, Mohsin S. Khan & Carmen M. Reinhart, Private Investment and Economic
Growth in Developing Countries, 18(1) Woiuz1n DFX. 19-27 (Jan. 1990); E. Borensztein, J. De
Gregorio & J.W. Lee, How does Forezn Direct Investment aject Economic Growth?, 45 J. INT'1
ECON. 115-135 (1998); Niels Hermes & Robert Lensink, Foreign Direct Investment, Financial
Development, and Economic Growth, 40(1) J. DF\. STul). 142-163 (2003).
88 On theories of compliance with international agreements and strategies for
measuring State compliance, see Beth Simmons, Compliance with International Agreements, 1
ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 75-93 (1998).
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obligations on national treatment (GATT Article III) and quantitative restrictions
(GATT Article XI). The General Agreement on Trade in Services ("GATS")
regulates obligations in relation to service suppliers who establish a commercial
presence in other WTO Member States.9 ' The Government Procurement
Agreement regulates WTO Member States' domestic laws, regulations, practices
and procedures applicable to government procurement contracts.91 While these
Agreements prescribe standards of treatment commonly used in international
trade law such as MFN clauses, national treatment clauses, among others, they do
not, however, specifically provide for investment protection. There is no
consolidated multilateral agreement yet that deals with international investment.
In recent years, however, investment issues have featured prominently in the
negotiation of regional trade cooperation agreements by developing countries.
This is a nascent phenomenon worth observing, particularly as the mechanisms
and innovations within these new investment chapters in trade agreements
respond to development concerns in the context of investment protection,
outside the traditional threshold of the Salini test. These treaties operationalise the
right to development outside the contested jurisdictional gatekeeping role of an
investment's "contributions to the host State's economic development", through
mechanisms such as: (1) permissible differentiation or graduated implementation
of host State obligations, taking the host State's stage of economic development
into account; (2) transparency obligations and information exchanges between
treaty partners; (3 ) joint investment promotion activities by treaty partners; and (4 )
coordinated institutional mechanisms that enable host State participation and
access in monitoring treaty interpretation and any investment-related rulemaking.
These mechanisms bring to mind the marked emphasis on transparency,
consultation, and review long prescribed in the 1976 OECD Declaration on
International Investment and Multinational Enterprises. 92 Unlike the Colonia
89 Arts. 1 & 2 of Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, The Legal
Texts: The Results Of The Uruguay Round Of Multilateral Trade Negotiations 143 (1999),
1868 U.N.T.S. 186, available at: http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal e/
legal e.htm#trims (last visited Nov. 1 2011) (hereinafter TRINIS Agreement).
90 Art. (2)(c) of General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1B, The Legal Texts: The
Results Of The Uruguay Round Of Multilateral Trade Negotiations 284 (1999), 1869
U.N.T.S. 183, 33 I.L.M. 1167 (1994), available at: http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/
legal e/legal e.htm#services (last visited Nov. 1, 2011).
91 Agreement on Government Procurement, Arts. I(1) & I(2), official text available at:
http:/ /www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal e/gpr-94_e.pdf (last visited Nov. 1, 2011).
92 Arts. II, IV-VI of OECD Declaration on International Investment and
Multinational Enterprises, reprinted in 15 I.L.M. 967 (1976), available at:
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Protocol of the Common Southern Market ("MERCOSUR") countries or
Chapter 11 of the NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement), 3 which
apply to developing countries but only contain (mostly) standard BIT provisions,
recent developing country investment agreements now purposely include more
treaty provisions to operationalize the international right to development.
Development-oriented innovations in the 2007 Investment Agreement on the
COMESA (Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa) Common
Investment Area, the 2009 ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations)
Comprehensive Investment Agreement, and the 2009 ASEAN-China Investment
Agreement are briefly examined and discussed below.
A. 2007 COMESA Investment Agreement
The 2007 Investment Agreement of the Common Market for Eastern and
Southern Africa ("COMESA") States ("COMESA Agreement") provides the
framework for the COMESA Common Investment Area ("CCIA").94 The
COMESA Common Investment Area includes nearly twenty States in Eastern
and Southern Africa, namely: Burundi, Comoros, the Democratic Republic of
Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi,
Mauritius, Rwanda, Seychelles, Sudan, Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia, and
Zimbabwe. Under the 2007 COMESA Agreement, the CCIA is intended to be an
area for "coordinated COMESA investment co-operation programme that will
generate increased investments from COMESA and non-COMESA sources";
where there is "freer flow of capital, skilled labour and professionals, and
technology among Member States"; where Member States will "extend national
treatment to COMESA investors by 2010" and "ensure all economic activities are
opened for investment to COMESA investors by 2010"; and where "the private
sector is a partner and fully participates in investment and related activities of the
Common Market as provided for under Article 151 of the COMESA Treaty".95
The Preamble to the COMESA Agreement recognizes that "particular
pressures on the balance of payments of a Member State in the process of
http://www.oecd.org/document/53/0,3746,en_2649_34887_1933109_1_1_1_1,00.html
(last visited Nov. 1, 2011).
93 See 1994 Protocol of Colonia for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of
Investments in Mercosur; Chapter 11 (Investment) of the North American Free Trade
Area (NAFTA) Agreement.
94 See Peter Muchlinski, The COMESA Common Investment Area: Substantive Standards and
Procedural Problems in Dispute Settlement, SOAS School of Law Research Paper No. 11/2010,
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1698209 (last visited Aug. 15, 2011).
95 Investment Agreement for the COMESA Common Investment Area, 2007
(hereinafter 2007 COMESA Investment Agreement), art. 3.
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economic development or economic transition may necessitate the use of
restrictions to ensure, inter alia, the maintenance of a level of financial reserves
adequate for the implementation of its programme of economic development or
economic transition".9 6 Thus, the Agreement permits COMESA Member States
to submit a Temporary Exclusion List and/or Sensitive List to the CCIA
Committee, the body tasked with the supervision and monitoring of Member
States' measures to implement the Agreement." These Lists enable COMESA
Member States to partially or wholly, temporarily or permanently, exclude forms
of investment, subject to a periodic review by the CCIA every two years. Member
States also have detailed transparency obligations, such as to report to the CCIA
Committee and publish "all relevant measures which pertain to, or affect, the
operation of this Agreement".98 It is a fundamental general obligation of the
COMESA Member States to "undertake appropriate actions to promote
transparency and consistency in the application and interpretation of their
investment laws, regulations and administrative procedures".99
COMESA Member States may modify or withdraw their respective
commitments under Schedules I to III of the Agreement, as well as their
corresponding Action Plans, subject to the consideration of the CCIA
Committee. They may also amend their respective Sensitive Lists and Temporary
Exclusion Lists "subject to the preservation of rights for a COMESA investor
who has commenced the process of establishing an investment or who has
established an investment" pursuant to the Agreement."" Noticeably, these
obligations of transparency are purposely excluded from the coverage of
investors' recourse to dispute settlement under Part Two (Rights and Obligations)
of the Agreement."o"
It is also observable that the substantive rights and obligations involving
investor protection in the COMESA Agreement frequently contain language that
recognizes differentiation for COMESA Member States according to their levels
of development, when appropriate. For example, COMESA Member States are
obligated to accord "fair and equitable treatment to COMESA investors and their
investments, in accordance with customary international law. Fair and equitable
treatment includes the obligation not to deny justice in criminal, civil, or
administrative adjudicatory proceedings in accordance with the principle of due
96 Id. at Preamble, T 6.
97 Id. arts. 1(13), 1(14), and 18, in relation to arts. 7(1) to 7(7).
98 Id. arts. 4(1) to 4(4).
99 Id. art. 5(a).
101 Id. arts. 9(1) to 9(3).
10t Id. art. 10.
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process embodied in the principal legal systems of the world." 102 However, the
Agreement also provides that, "[flor greater certainty, Member States understand
that different Member States have different forms of administrative, legislative
and judicial systems and that Member States at different levels of development
may not achieve the same standards at the same time". 1o3 With respect to
employment decisions, though the Agreement recognizes the right of investors to
hire "technically qualified persons from any country", it also obligates investors to
"accord a priority to workers who possess the same qualifications and are
available in the Member State or any other Member State". 104 The obligation to
observe national treatment "in like circumstances" is clarified in the COMESA
Agreement as requiring "an overall examination on a case by case basis of all the
circumstances of an investment, including, inter alia:
(a) its effects on third persons and the local community;
(b) its effects on the local, regional or national environment, including the
cumulative effects of all investments within a jurisdiction on the
environment;
(c) the sector the investor is in;
(d) the aim of the measure concerned;
(e) the regulatory process generally applied in relation to the measure
concerned;
(f) other factors directly relating to the investment or investor in relation
to the measure concerned". 10s
Payment of compensation awarded in case of expropriation, when
"significantly burdensome on a host State", may be "paid yearly over a period
agreed by the Parties, subject to interest at the rate established by agreement of
the disputants or by a tribunal". 1016 Bona fide regulatory measures that are
designed and applied to protect or enhance "legitimate public welfare objectives,
such as public health, safety and the environment", shall not constitute an indirect
expropriation under the COMESA Agreement.107
Noticeably, the COMESA Agreement broadly provides for "emergency
safeguard measures", which a COMESA Member State may provisionally and
non-discriminatorily take "to the extent and for such period as may be necessary
to prevent or to remedy such injury", when the Member State "suffers or is
102 Id. art. 14(1).
10o Id. art. 14(3).
1o4 Id. art. 16.
10o Id. art. 17.
106 Id. art. 20(5).
10 Id. art. 20(8).
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threatened with any serious injury", "as a result of opening up of economic
activities in accordance with the Agreement".' The Member State must notify
the CCIA Committee within 14 days from taking the emergency safeguard
measure, including a "justification of such action supported by evidence gathered
from an investigation".' 19 The CCIA Committee shall "determine what
constitutes serious injury and threat of serious injury and the procedures of
instituting emergency safeguard measures pursuant to this Article".o Similarly, a
COMESA Member State's measure to safeguard its balance of payments, "in the
event of serious balance of payment and external financial difficulties or threat
thereof", should likewise be notified to the CCIA Committee, who will review
such measures according to its applicable rules and procedures.'
B. 2009 ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement
The 2009 Association of Southeast Asian Nations ("ASEAN")
Comprehensive Investment Agreement ("ACIA") was signed by the ASEAN
Economic Ministers on 26 February 2009, and has been ratified by seven of the
ten ASEAN States, till date.112 The ACIA will only enter into force "after all
Member States have notified, or, where necessary, deposited instruments of
ratification with the Secretary-General of ASEAN, which shall not take more than
180 days after the signing of [the] Agreement"." 3 The ACIA is designed to
govern intra-ASEAN investments in manufacturing, agriculture, fishery, forestry,
mining and quarrying, services incidental to such activities, and any other sectors
that may be agreed upon by all ten ASEAN Member States. 114 During the August
2011 Plenary Meeting of the ASEAN Economic Ministers, the ASEAN
Investment Area Council declared that it would aim to complete the remaining
Member States' ratifications of the ACIA before the next ASEAN Summit
1uo Id. art. 24(1).
'( Id. art. 24(2).
no Id. art. 24(3).
n Id. arts. 25(1) to 25(5).
112 As of this writing, the ASEAN Secretariat reports that Member States such as
Brunei Darussalam (Sept. 9, 2009), Cambodia (Oct. 17, 2009), Laos (Nov. 27, 2009),
Malaysia (Aug. 5, 2009), through an Instrument of Notification, M yanmar (Aug. 6, 2009),
through a Notification Letter), Philippines (Apr. 2, 2009), and Singapore (Aug. 12, 2009),
through a Notification Letter), have ratified the ACIA. See status of ratifications of all
ASEAN treaties, including the ACIA, in http://www.asean.org/Ratification.pdf (last
visited June 15, 2011).
11 ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement 2009, art. 48(1), available at:
http://www.aseansec.org/documents/FINAL-SIGNED-ACIA.pdf (last visited June 15,
2011) (hereinafter ACIA).
114 ACIA arts. 3(1) to 3(4).
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Meeting in November 2011."5
The ACIA is designed to "create a free and open investment regime in
ASEAN in order to achieve the end goal of economic integration under the AEC
(ASEAN Economic Community)".11 6 The ACIA recognizes "the different levels
of development within ASEAN especially the least developed Member States
which require some flexibility including special and differential treatment as
ASEAN moves toward a more integrated and interdependent future".'? Such
special and differential treatment to the newer ASEAN Member States, namely,
Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam, refer to technical assistance in
investment policies and promotion, commitments in areas of interest to these
States, and the recognition that "commitments by each newer ASEAN Member
State may be made in accordance with its individual stage of development"."
Implementation of the ACIA falls under the responsibilty of the ASEAN
Investment Area Council, which provides policy guidance, oversight,
coordination, review of ACIA implementation, and reports to and informs the
ASEAN Economic Ministers (AEM) on the implementation and operation of the
ACIA.119
Similar to the COMESA Agreement, the ACIA also permits ASEAN
Member States to submit their respective Reservations Lists to the ASEAN
Secretariat, "for the endorsement of the AIA Council within 6 months after the
date of signing of [the] Agreement".12() These Reservations Lists refer to existing
measures maintained by a Member State, either at the central, regional, or local
level of government, to which the obligations under Article 5 (National
Treatment) and Article 8 (Senior Management and Board of Directors) will not
apply.121 \Within 12 months from the submission of the Reservation List, the
ASEAN Member State concerned may "adopt any measures or modify any of its
reservations made ... for prospective applications to investors of any other
Member States and their investments, provided that such measures or
modification shall not adversely affect any existing investors and investments".122
us ASEAN Aims to Complete Investment Agreement before November, Xinhua
News, Aug. 11, 2011, available at: http://english.cri.cn/6966/2011/08/
11/2743s653055.htm (last visited Aug. 15, 2011).
116 ACIA, supra note 113, art. 1.
17 Id. at Preamble, T 2 in relation to art. 2(f) ("grant special and differential treatment
and other flexibilities to Member States depending on their level of development and
sectoral sensitivities").
118 Id. art. 23.
119 Id. art. 42(3).
12(1 Id. art. 9(2).
121 Id. art. 9(1).
12 2 Id. art. 10(1).
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Also fairly similar to the COMESA Investment Agreement are the
transparency obligations of the ASEAN Member States under the ACIA, which
require them to: (1) "promptly and at least annually inform the ASEAN
Investment Area ("AIA") Council of any investment-related agreements or
arrangements which it has entered into and where preferential treatment was
granted"; (2) "promptly and at least annually inform the AIA Council of the
introduction of any new law or of any changes to existing laws, regulations or
administrative guidelines, which significantly affect investments or commitments
of a Member State under [the] Agreement"; (3) "make publicly available, all
relevant laws, regulations and administrative guidelines of general application that
pertain to, or affect investments in the territory of the Member State"; and (4)
"establish or designate an enquiry point where, upon request of any natural
person, juridical person or any other Member State, all information relating to the
measures required to be published.. .may be promptly obtained".123
Perhaps somewhat unpredictably, the ACIA contains more detailed
provisions than the COMESA Agreement; it permits ASEAN Member States to
alter their mode and degree of compliance with substantive obligations,
presumably for reasons of ensuring host State control over public policies most
directly involved in economic development. Member States may prevent or delay
transfers "through the equitable, non-discriminatory, and good faith application
of its laws and regulations" in various matters, such as "bankruptcy, insolvency, or
the protection of the rights of creditors", "issuing, trading, or dealing in securities,
futures, options, or derivatives", "financial reporting or record keeping of
transfers when necessary to assist law enforcement or financial regulatory
authorities", among others.124 It is also recognized that Member States can impose
restrictions on capital transactions "where, in exceptional circumstances,
movements of capital cause, or threaten to cause, serious economic or financial
disturbance in the Member State concerned." 125 These restrictions must be: (1)
"consistent with the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund";
(2) "not exceed those necessary to deal with the circumstances"; (3) "temporary
and shall be eliminated as soon as conditions no longer justify their institution or
maintenance"; (4) "promptly be notified to the other Member States"; (5)
"applied such that any one of the other Member States is treated no less
favourably than any other Member State or non-Member State"; (6) "applied on a
national treatment basis"; and (I) "avoid unnecessary damage to investors and
covered investments, and the commercial, economic, and financial interests of the
other Member States".126 The ACIA also contains an extensive and detailed
123 Id. art. 21 (1).
12 4 Id. art. 13(3).
125 Id. art. 13(4)(c).
126 Id. art. 13(5).
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provision permitting ASEAN Member States to "adopt or maintain restrictions
on payments or transfers related to investments", in the event of "serious balance-
of-payments and external financial difficulties or threats thereof". 127 The ACIA
explicitly recognizes "that particular pressures on the balance-of-payments of a
Member State in the process of economic development may necessitate the use of
restrictions to ensure, inter alia, the maintenance of a level of financial reserves
adequate for the implementation of its programme of economic development". 128
The ACIA also appears to permit States to exempt conservation or sustainable
development measures from the coverage of the ACIA, since "nothing in this
Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any
Member State of measures... relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural
resources if such measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on
domestic production or consumption" J'
C. 2009 ASEAN-China Investment Agreement
The 2009 ASEAN-China Investment Agreement ("ASEAN-China
Agreement") entered into force on 1a January 2010.13w Barely a year after its
coming into force, China's direct investment into ASEAN countries has grown to
US$ 2.57 billion, while direct investment from ASEAN countries to China
reached US$ 6.32 billion, accounting for a 37.5% increase in trade volume
between China and ASEAN countries, making ASEAN countries "a major source
of investment for China".131 The ASEAN-China Agreement seeks to "promote
investment flows and to create a liberal, facilitative, transparent and competitive
investment regime in ASEAN and China".132 It builds on the 2002 Framework
Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation between ASEAN and
China, which recognized "the different stages and pace of development among
the Parties and the need for special and differential treatment and flexibility for
the newer ASEAN Member States of Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar and Viet
Nam".133
The 2009 ASEAN-China Agreement does not apply national treatment
127 Id. art. 16(1).
128 Id. art. 16(1).
129 Id. art. 17(1)(D.
131 ASEAN-China Investment Agreement, supra note 10.
131 China's direct investment to ASEAN countries reaches $2.57b, Xinhua News,
China, Mar. 2, 2011, available at: http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2011-
03/02/content 12104984.htm (last visited Aug. 15, 2011).
132 ASEAN-China Investment Agreement, supra note 10, art. 2.
133 Id. Preamble, T 3. See also Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic
Cooperation between ASEAN and the People's Republic of China, November 2002,
available at: http://www.asean.org/13196.htm (last visited Aug. 15, 2011).
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(Article 4) and most-favoured-nation treatment (Article 5) to "existing or new
non-conforming measures maintained or adopted", as well as the "continuation
or amendment" of such measures. 134 Similar to the ACIA, the ASEAN-China
Investment Agreement also permits a host State to "prevent or delay a transfer
through the equitable, non-discriminatory and good faith application of its laws
and regulations", such as those involving "bankruptcy, loss of ability or capacity
to make payments, or protection of the right of creditors"; "non-fulfilment of the
host Party's transfer requirements in respect of trading or dealing in securities,
futures, options or derivatives"; and "financial reporting or record keeping of
transfers when necessary to assist law enforcement or financial regulatory
authorities", among others.135 The Agreement also permits Parties to impose
restrictions on capital transactions "in exceptional circumstances", when
"movements of capital cause, or threaten to cause, serious economic or financial
disturbance in the Party concerned, provided such restrictions do not affect the
rights and obligations of the Parties as members of the WTO".136
Parties are also permitted to "adopt or maintain restrictions on investments,
including payments or transfers related to such investments", where there is a
"serious balance of payments and external financial difficulties or threat thereof",
borne out of the recognition that "particular pressures on the balance of
payments of a Party in the process of economic development may necessitate the
use of restrictions to ensure, inter alia, the maintenance of a level of financial
reserves adequate for the implementation of its programme of economic
development".' 3 The Agreement also contains conditions nearly identical to the
ACIA in relation to measures safeguarding balance of payments, general
exceptions for public policy concerns, and security exceptions." The detailed
transparency provisions in the ASEAN-China Agreement are likewise similar to
those in the ACIA.139
As may be seen from the foregoing, these recent trade-based IIAs incorporate
development concerns through measures other than the gatekeeping function of
the Salini test. The international right to development is arguably operationalized
in more concrete ways than the Salini test, to the extent that the innovations in
these treaties enable developing countries to obtain access to transparent
information on investment regulation and protection; retain vital policy discretion
for areas crucial to development and sensitive areas of regulation vital to the
134 Id. art. 6(1).
131 Id. art. 6(3).
136 Id. art. 10(5).
137 Id. art. 11(1).
138 Id. arts. 11(2), 16 and 17.
139 Id. art. 19.
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process of economic development; and permit developing countries to exclude,
differentiate, or qualify their mode and degree of compliance with treaty
obligations in areas of administrative and statutory regulation deemed vital to
economic development.
V. THE INTERNATIONAL RIGHT TO DEVELOPMENT AS AN IIA REALITY
Transposing the international right of development into the reality of
functioning international investment treaties is admittedly, quite a difficult
conceptual merger between a well-established "third-generation" international
human rights norm, and the specialized treaty norms governing international
investment. The experience of international investment adjudication illustrates
one such concrete difficulty in attempting to use development as a norm to
determine the meaning of covered "investments" within investment treaties and
Article 25 of the ICSID Convention. As shown in this article, the Salini standard
does not provide a coherent definition of economic development, and reduces
arbitral tribunals to little more than armchair economists hazarding estimates of a
given investment's contribution to a host State's economic development. The
practical effect of the Salini test, judging from the outcomes of arbitrations where
the test has been asserted, is for arbitrators to adopt an expansive view of
"contributions to a host State's economic development", to the point that
virtually no economic activity, transaction, or operation can be ruled out or
excluded by the Salini test. The nullified findings of the sole arbitrator in Mala'sia
Historical Sa/vors remains somewhat of a cautionary tale for future arbitral tribunals
seeking to define and delimit the parameters of what truly consists a "contribution
to a host State's economic development". While the aim of preserving the balance
of investment protection and host State development is laudable, it is more than
likely that the inherent imprecision and subjectivities of the Salini test would not
be the most advisable way of achieving this balance.
As seen from the nature, history, and scope of the international right of
development alongside the practice of development formulations and innovations
in recent trade-based IIAs, it is argued that the international right of development
can instead be a workable and vital aspect of contemporary investment treaty
design. While the viability of these innovations remains to be tested in the future,
when ripe controversies arise in relation to the State's use of such development-
driven innovations and mechanisms, they may be tentatively assessed and
scrutinized, especially in relation to how they are monitored and reviewed by the
trade-based institutions and bodies that are responsible for the coordinated
implementation of these new IIAs. While the majority of arbitral tribunals rightly
deny "contribution to the host State's economic development" as a strict
condition for treaty coverage and jurisdiction - instead treating the same as a
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descriptive characteristic or feature of investment - the international right of
development arguably appears to be more specifically deployed for the emerging
regimes created under the new trade-based IIAs, in a manner more aligned with
the nature of implementation envisaged for the international right of
development. These new trade-based IIAs provide for other feasible gateways for
the international right of development, which, (and perhaps more so than its
current jurisdictional gatekeeping role) concretely support the inherent reciprocity
of the host State's economic development and protection of investors in
international investment law.
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